The samurai and globalization: does culture matter for development?
Augusto Lopez-Claros & Valeria Perotti
The transformation of Japan
into a modern economy at the end of the 19th century is a tale of
culture and cultural change. The centuries-long transmission of values like
honor, loyalty, duty, obedience and discipline in the bushido (the code of conduct of the samurai) contributed in
fundamental ways to shape Japan’s
human capital. However, a change in mindset – triggered by the personal influence
of key political figures – needed to happen in order for the country to devote
its efforts to economic development.
Japan’s
250-year old feudal shogunate collapsed in 1867-68 and power returned to the
emperor in Kyoto.
The Home Minister appointed in 1873, Okubo Toshimichi, was relentless in the
recruitment of talent for his Ministry, believing that promotions should be based
on merit rather than family or military connections, and that those trained
abroad were particularly well-suited to assist him in his efforts to launch
Japan in a sustained process of modernization. But perhaps Okubo’s most
important attribute was his willingness to examine the economic and scientific
achievements in the developed world and to inspire others at home with a vision
of the meaning of a modern Japan.
Okubo embarked on a program of
reforms, such as export promotion, the development of a merchant marine, the
establishment of model factories, and government loans to small-scale industry.
By 1878, when a group of former samurai assassinated Okubo as a consequence of
the deep grievances generated by the collapse of the shogunate in key segments
of Japanese society, the mindset had changed and Okubo’s associates had no
problems moving his program forward. Within a hundred years, Japan had
emerged as the world’s second largest economy and one of its foremost
technological innovators.
It is difficult to argue against
the extent to which a particular work ethic and system of personal values and
attitudes—part of what we normally understand as culture—played a central role
in Japan’s
emergence as a world economic power. But for a variety of reasons, economists
have avoided getting too closely involved with the concept of culture and its
relationship to economic development. There is a general acceptance that culture
must have a role in guiding a population along a particular path, but, as Landes
(2000) points out, a discomfort with what can be construed as implied criticism
of a particular culture has discouraged broader public discourse.
The role of culture in economic
development is not an easy subject to get a handle on. To start with, one faces
issues of definition. The more all-encompassing the definition, the less
helpful it tends to be in explaining patterns of development. Economists tend
to narrowly define culture as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic,
religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to
generation” (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). This approach is largely
dictated by the aim to identify causal relationships, by focusing on aspects of
culture that are constant over time. Not surprisingly, some of the most
insightful writing on the subject has been done by anthropologists. Murdock
(1965) argues that a culture consists of habits that are shared by members of a
society. It is the product of learning, not of heredity. Woolcock (2014)
highlights how the sociologic scholarship has evolved to consider culture as
“shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which
people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler, 1986, p.273).
A second complication is that even
with a sensible definition, one would have to confront the fact that cultural identity is not fixed. Cultural
change—anthropologists tell us—begins with processes of innovation, of which
cultural borrowing or diffusion is by far the most common. But it can also be precipitated by social
acceptance, by selective elimination and by integration.
From a policy perspective, malleable
aspects of culture are more interesting as they open up the possibility for
intervention. The World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report cites a number of
examples of interventions that have determined a cultural change to trigger
improvements in welfare: one example is political affirmative action for women
in West Bengal.
There are other
complications, however, in attempting to use cultural explanations for economic
development.Huntington (2000) remarks how in the early 1960s Ghana and Korea were broadly comparable in terms
of income per capita, structure of production, and foreign aid. Thirty years
later the contrast could not be more pronounced. According to Huntington, culture had a major role in
explaining it: “South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education,
organization, and discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short,
cultures count.”[1] The
problem with this formulation is that it does not provide a very auspicious
basis to start a dialogue with Ghana
as to how they could catch up with Korea. Not surprisingly,
international financial organizations and bilateral donors have shied away from
framing the debate in terms of cultural norms.
Beyond issues of presentation, it
is possible that “culture”, in fact, disguises other forces at work, more amenable
to change. How much of the Ghana’s
stunted development is simply the result of bad policies? In many developing
countries investors are unwilling to plan for the long-term because of the risks
associated with political instability. What may appear to be cultural traits
may, in fact, be behaviors shaped by economic incentives and thus amenable to
change through changes in the underlying incentives. So, to take an example, the absence of a work
ethic in the Soviet Union was not a reflection
of some ingrained cultural trait, but rather was a natural response to an
environment in which wage differentials were extremely narrow, promotion was
not linked to performance, and life-time employment was more or less
guaranteed. People’s behaviour at work was totally consistent with this
particular set of dis-incentives.
Sachs (2000) identifies a number of
factors which have fundamentally affected development in various parts of the
world and can be detached from conceptions of culture. He notes, for instance,
the (dis)advantages of geography, such as access to natural resources, being
landlocked or part of a poor, volatile neighborhood. Easterly (2006) discusses
the heavy burden on Africa associated with the
historically arbitrary demarcation of international borders. Poverty may have
more to do with geography and climate, with natural resource management, and with
the toxic interactions between ethnic diversity and artificial borders, than
with purely cultural factors.
As a result of globalization, because
“citizens are more exposed to successful behaviors elsewhere” (Porter, 1990 p.
26), geography, climate, and natural resources are gradually giving way to
knowledge, education, and access to new technologies as the key drivers of
productivity and economic growth. We are witnessing the gradual emergence of a
universal, global culture based on such values as adherence to civil and human
rights, gender equality, respect for property rights, the rule of law,
acceptance of market forces as a mechanism for resource allocation.
In saying that education and the
acquisition of knowledge and skills are desirable development objectives we are
making a statement that holds true across different regions of the world, that
applies to all contemporary civilizations. Of course, societies will differ in
the ways and the extent to which they have internalized some of these values in
their policies, their traditions and their institutions. Acceptance of the
desirability of gender equality, for instance, does not mean that inequalities
and injustices based on gender—deeply entrenched in all our cultures, to a
greater or lesser extent—will suddenly disappear. But few would disagree with
the thesis that gender disparities are out of step with modernity and that
their presence retards human progress. Development is not only about reducing
poverty and expanding opportunities against the background of rising incomes.
It is also in a very fundamental way about adopting a set of values that are
compatible with humanity’s moral development.
References:
Easterly, William. 2006. The white
man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and
so little good. New York:
Penguin Press.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2006. “Does
Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 23-48.
Harrison, Lawrence E., Samuel P
Huntington. 2000. Culture Matters. New York: Basic Books.
Landes, David. 1998. The Wealth
and Poverty of Nations. London:
Little, Brown and Company.
Murdock, George Peter. 1965. Culture
and Society. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg
Press.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 2000. Notes on a new
sociology of economic development. In: Harrison,
L.E., S.P. Huntington. 2000. Culture Matters. New York: Basic Books, 29-43.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in
action: symbols and strategies”, American Sociological Review 51: 273-286.
Woolcock, Michael. 2014. “Culture,
Politics, and Development”. Policy Research Working Paper 6939. Washington: The World
Bank.
