Nine Reasons why Corruption is a Destroyer of Human Prosperity
In an earlier blog
post, we commented on the sources of corruption, the factors that have
turned it into a powerful obstacle to sustainable economic development.
We noted that the presence of dysfunctional and onerous regulations and
poorly formulated policies, often created incentives for individuals
and businesses to short-circuit them through the paying of bribes. We
now turn to the consequences of corruption, to better understand why it
is a destroyer of human prosperity.
First, corruption undermines government revenue and, therefore, limits
the ability of the government to invest in productivity-enhancing areas.
Where corruption is endemic, individuals will view paying taxes as a
questionable business proposition. There is a delicate tension between
the government in its role as tax collector and the business community
and individuals as tax payers. The system works reasonably well when
those who pay taxes feel that there is a good chance that they will see a
future payoff, such as improvements in the country’s infrastructure,
better schools and a better-trained and healthier workforce. Corruption
sabotages this implicit contract. When corruption is allowed to flourish
taxpayers will feel justified in finding creative ways to avoid paying
taxes or, worse, become bribers themselves.
To the extent that corruption undermines revenue, it adversely
affects government efforts to reduce poverty. Money that leaks out of
the budget because of corruption will not be available to lighten the
burden of the poor. Of course, corruption also undermines the case of
those who argue that foreign aid can be an important element of the
fight against global poverty—why should taxpayers in the richer
countries be asked to support the lavish lifestyles of the kleptocrats
in corrupt states?
Second, corruption distorts the decision-making connected with public investment projects (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
Large capital projects provide tempting opportunities for corruption.
Governments will often undertake projects of a larger scope or
complexity than warranted by the needs of the country. Public investment
will thus be higher—the world is littered with the skeletons of white
elephants, often built with external credits, and representing a heavy
burden on meager budgets. In the context of scarce resources,
governments will find it necessary to cut spending elsewhere, sometimes
in socially vital areas, or in operations and maintenance. Tanzi (1998)
plausibly argues that corruption will also reduce expenditure on health
and education because these are areas where it may be more difficult to
collect bribes, though some
have argued that provider absenteeism, a serious problem in the
educational and health sectors of many countries, is itself a form of
“quiet/silent corruption.”
Third, there is solid empirical evidence that the higher the level of
corruption in a country, the larger the share of its economic activity
that will go underground, beyond the reach of the tax authorities. Not
surprisingly, studies have shown that corruption also undermines foreign
direct investment since it acts in ways that are indistinguishable from
a tax; other things being equal, investors will always prefer to
establish themselves in less corrupt countries. Wei (2000)
reviewed FDI data from 14 source countries to 45 host countries, and
concluded that: “an increase in the corruption level from that of
Singapore to that of Mexico is equivalent to raising the tax rate by
21-24 percentage points.”
Fourth, corruption discourages private-sector development and
innovation and encourages inefficiency. Budding entrepreneurs with
bright ideas will be intimidated by the bureaucratic obstacles,
financial costs and psychological burdens of starting new business
ventures and will either opt for taking their ideas to some other less
corrupt country or, more likely, desist altogether. In either case,
economic growth is adversely affected. The high incidence of corruption
will mean an additional financial burden on businesses, undermining
their international competitiveness. Unlike a tax, which is known and
predictable and can be built into the cost structure of the enterprise
in an orderly fashion, bribes are unpredictable and will complicate cost
control, reduce profits and undermine the efficiency of those who must
pay them to stay in business. Mauro (1995)
used some indices of corruption and institutional efficiency to show
that corruption lowers investment and, hence, economic growth.
Fifth, corruption contributes to a misallocation of human resources.
To sustain a system of corruption, officials and those who pay them will
have to invest time and effort in the development of certain skills,
nurture certain relationships, and build up a range of supporting
institutions and opaque systems, such as off-the-books transactions,
secret bank accounts, and the like. Surveys have shown that the greater
the incidence of corruption in the country, the greater the share of
time that management has to allocate to dealing with ensuring compliance
with regulations, avoiding penalties, and dealing with the bribery
system that underpins them, activities that draw attention and resources
away from production, strategic planning, and so on.
Sixth, corruption has disturbing distributional implications.
Empirical work shows that corruption actually contributes to worsening
income distribution. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (1998)
have shown that corruption, by lowering economic growth, perceptibly
pushes up income inequality. It also distorts the tax system because the
wealthy and powerful are able to use their connections to make sure
that the tax system works in their favor. It leads to inefficient
targeting of social programs, many of which will acquire regressive
features, with benefits disproportionately allocated to the higher
income brackets; e.g., gasoline subsidies to the car-owning middle
classes in India.
Seventh, corruption creates uncertainty. There are no enforceable
property rights emanating from a transaction involving bribery. The firm
that obtains a concession from a bureaucrat as a result of bribery
cannot know with certainty how long the benefit will last. The terms of
the “contract” may have to be constantly renegotiated to extend the life
of the benefit or to prevent its collapse. Indeed, the briber, having
flouted the law, may fall prey to extortion from which it may prove
difficult to extricate himself. In an uncertain environment with
insecure property rights, the firm will be less willing to invest and to
plan for the longer-term. A short-term focus to maximize short-term
profits will be the optimal strategy, even if this leads to
deforestation, say, or the rapid exhaustion of non-renewable resources.
This uncertainty is partly responsible for a perversion in the sorts
of incentives that prompt individuals to want to seek public office.
Where corruption is rife, politicians will want to remain in office as
long as possible, not because they are even remotely serving the public
good, but merely because they will not want to yield to others the
pecuniary benefits of high office. Where long stays in office are no
longer an option, then the new government will want to steal as much as
possible as quickly as possible, given a relatively short window of
opportunity.
Eighth, because corruption is a betrayal of trust, it diminishes the
legitimacy of the state and moral stature of the bureaucracy in the eyes
of the population. While efforts will be made to shroud such corrupt
transactions in secrecy, particularly when the opportunities for bribery
are linked to some government-inspired initiative, the relevant details
will leak out and will tarnish the reputation of the government,
thereby damaging its credibility and limiting its ability to become a
constructive agent of change. Corrupt governments will have a tougher
time being credible enforcers of contracts and protectors of property
rights.
Ninth, bribery and corruption lead to other forms of crime. Because
corruption breeds corruption, it tends soon enough to lead to the
creation of mafias and organized criminal groups who use their financial
power to infiltrate legal businesses, to intimidate, to create
protection rackets and a climate of fear and uncertainty. In states with
weak institutions, the police may be overwhelmed, reducing the
probability that criminals will be caught. This, in turn, encourages
more people to become corrupt, further impairing the efficiency of law
enforcement, a vicious cycle that will affect the investment climate in
noxious ways, further undermining economic growth. In many countries, as
corruption gives rise to mafias and organized crime, the police and
other organs of the state may themselves become criminalized. By then,
businesses will not only have to deal with corruption-ridden
bureaucracies, but they will also be vulnerable to attacks from
competitors who will pay the police or tax inspectors to harass and
intimidate.
There is really no limit to the extent to which corruption, once it
is unleashed, can undermine the stability of the state and organized
society. Tax inspectors will extort businesses; the police will kidnap
innocents and demand ransom; the prime minister will demand payoffs to
make himself available for meetings; aid money will disappear into the
private offshore bank accounts of senior officials; the head of state
will demand that particular taxes be credited directly to his personal
account. Investment will come to a standstill, or, worse, capital flight
will lead to disinvestment. In countries where corruption becomes
intertwined with domestic politics, separate centers of power will
emerge to rival the power of the state. At that point, the chances that
the government will actually be able to do anything to control
corruption will disappear and the state will mutate into a kleptocracy,
the eighth circle of hell in Dante’s Divine Comedy.
Alternatively, the state, to preserve its power, may opt for warfare,
engulfing the country in a cycle of violence. In any case, corrupt
failed, or failing, states become a security threat for the whole
international community, “because they are incubators of terrorism, the
narcotics trade, money laundering, human trafficking, and other global
crime—raising issues far beyond corruption itself” (Heineman and Heimann 2006).